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Abstract. the public interest is a syntagm 
frequently used to account for the projects and ac-
tions of local government authorities. the current 
study analyses the way local elected officials relate 
to the content and the meaning of this concept. 
the quality of the social dialogue, the duality of the 
public life, the referential models of public policies 
are some sources of the gap between the adminis-
trative agenda and the citizens’ agenda. 
Accepting public interest as a guiding rule in 
designing public sectors activities for community 
welfare involves adjusting both the ambitions of the 
politicians and the social and economic pressures. 
the representation of the public interest requires 
temporary compromise and transparent decisions, 
based on evidence, innovation and creativity.
Keywords: public interest, representation, 
decisions.
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1. Rhetoric of the public interest
In spite of the absence of a clear definition, labeled as ‘a childish myth’, ‘a fable’ 
(Bozeman, 2007, p. 84), or a ‘ghost’ (Lucy, 1988, p. 148), ambiguous and abstract, 
the public interest is still a fundamental concept for a democratic system and a 
good administration. The existence of public administration as a formal structure 
is motivated by the serving of the public interest. The political decision makers 
have the mission to choose the best alternatives in order to ensure the well-being. 
Most attempts to describe what is meant by ‘public interest’ refer to ‘communi-
ty’, ‘common welfare’, ‘general welfare’, ‘society’, ‘public’ or ‘nation’. Neverthe-
less, the question of what means ‘public’ in ‘public interest’ was largely left un-
explained (Wheeler, 2016a, p. 6). The few attempts to measure the public interest 
were also unsuccessful. Bozeman sees that the idea of the philosopher Brian Barry 
to take a large number of examples of real situations – from cases, newspapers, 
books, speeches and conversations to see what can be done from them, considered 
as ‘the only satisfactory way to address the public interest’ was not taken over by 
the researchers (Bozeman, 2007, p. 84). The concept is criticized for the artificiali-
ty of the ideas and because it has ‘fundamentally undemocratic’ implications for 
the individuals. It is anti-liberal because the individual preferences can be subject 
to the preferences of an erroneously built majority. The answers to the questions 
about the essence and the measure of the public interest have been found in theo-
ries that put the individual interests within a larger collectivity and emphasize the 
normative value of the public interest (Anthony, 2013, p. 127). Bozeman considers 
this to be an unfounded criticism. In the public interest theory, problems are real 
(for example, schools that are not working), but ideals (for example, quality educa-
tion) are unstable, therefore, the public interest, considered as public value, should 
have multiple meanings (Bozeman, 2007, p. 101) 
The ambiguity and the abstract characteristic of the word have deep implica-
tions in the decision-making processes that can serve the interests of the members 
of a community. Considering these features of the notion of ‘public interest’, the 
existence of differences between the citizen’s agenda and the agenda of the local 
public authorities is inevitable. Moreover, for an ambiguously formulated common 
welfare, either there will be an equally ambiguous path or strategy to provide it, 
either an artificial ‘extension’ of the real direction, but especially a waste of effort, 
initiative and opportunities (Șandor, 1999, p. 9). Chris Wheeler, (Deputy Ombuds-
man, Sydney, Australia), with more than 30 years of experience in management 
and public administration, believes that there are at least three major obstacles for 
public servants that act on the public interest:
 • first of all, although it is one of the most used words in the vocabulary of the 
public administration, it is probably the least defined and the least understood 
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– few public servants would have a clear idea of what the term actually means 
and what ramifications are in practice;
 • secondly, the identification or the assessment of the adequate public interest 
for any special case is not often an easy task;
 • Third, while some have stated that it is quite easy to do what they need when 
they have already identified what is adequate, in practice, people often do not 
have the will or the courage to do what is necessary (Wheeler, 2013, p. 34). 
The ambiguity of the public interest is not an adequate justification for aban-
doning it: the public interest is a normative standard and raises the whole range 
of issues related to standards in general (Bozeman, 2007, p. 89). It is necessary to 
mention that the lack of a definition is not due to any omission but to the fluidity of 
the social interest networks (Iorga, 2006, p. 6). In the real social life there are many 
situations when a group can win only if the other one loses. In such a situation, 
whatever the decision may be, some interests seem favored and some others dis-
advantaged. For example, both the promotion and the restriction of tourism in the 
Danube Delta express desiderata of the public interest. The definition of the public 
interest in the Law no. 7/2004 concerning the Code of conduct for public servants, 
according to which public interest means ‘the totality of the rights, liberties and 
legitimate interests of the citizens, recognized by the Constitution, the internal leg-
islation and the international treaties to which Romania is a party, guaranteed and 
respected by the public institutions and authorities’ can serve as an argument for 
both situations. Neither the definition by which the public interest is considered 
a ‘system of defining values a for a better life, such as the chances of self-develop-
ment, the participation in social decisions, the equal chances or justice and social 
equity’ (Zamfir and Stanescu, 2007, p. 342) does not provide sufficient help to sup-
port a policy of promoting or restricting tourism. There are voices stating that the 
design of a system of values is almost impossible (Piccorelli, 2014, p. 12), proposing 
an aesthetic judgement of the decision as an alternative.
Considering the complexity and the pluralism of the contemporary society, 
it would not seem unusual to affirm, as some territorial planning theorists have 
said, that ’public interest does not exist’. Rather, there is a number of different and 
competing interests. The interests of different persons and groups are nowadays 
too manifold to have similar points in common. The statement ‘the public interest 
does not exist’ has been interpreted in at least three ways: 1. The public interest 
does not exist as a fact; 2. The public interest does not exist as an extra-individual 
(holistic) value; 3. The public interest does not exist as an overriding value, always 
imperative. 
Moroni (2004, p. 152) considers that there are no convincing reasons to give 
up the concept of public interest, on the contrary, that there are ways to re-con-
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struct this concept that can prove relevant even in modern societies characterized 
by complexity and pluralism. 
In Romania, the concerns about public interest research are modest. A study – 
‘The public interest: A current subject or outdated rhetoric?’ – conducted under the 
coordination of the Institute for Public Policies analyses two actual problems (case 
studies): a) the membership of the Romanian high officials to a series of structures 
such as board of directors and the shareholders’ general assembly, to state owned 
or private companies, privatization committees, etc., by way of exception to the 
rule of incompatibilities appointed in the Anti-Corruption Law; b) the offering of 
company housing and/or corporate housing to Romanian high officials in central 
areas of the capital (Iorga, 2006). The study reflects major shortcomings in the in-
terpretation of public interest.
Even if no consensus on the definition has been reached, the authors of the 
study argue that the pursuit of the public interest implies some necessary, though 
not sufficient, conditions: (1) the correct use of public resources; (2) the harmoni-
zation of personal interests and values with the public interests pursued at the 
workplace; (3) professionalism in the pursuit of the public interests and in the use 
of public resources, which includes many conditions, such as: the effort to under-
stand the problems faced and to find legitimate solutions; compliance with moral 
norms and laws, with possible exceptions solely justified on moral grounds (in the 
case of rules or laws considered incorrect); the identification and the correction of 
past mistakes (Iorga, 2006, p. 69).
‘The encyclopedia of social development’ (Zamfir and Stănescu, 2007) inserts 
some theoretical and practical explanations regarding the definition of the public 
interest, even in the development programs, which become criteria for evaluating 
public policies from the perspective of the public interest, etc.
‘The Public Interest’ is a relatively recent work (2014) in which the author 
Madalina Tomescu draws attention to what really means the public interest, the 
way it is formed and what is the relation between the achievement of the public 
interest and the right to a good governance of the citizens. In this paper we discuss 
about the local public interest, without opposing it to the national or general public 
interest. Professor Paul Negulescu said that in each country there are two catego-
ries of interest: some that have a completely general character regarding all the cit-
izens, the whole community, and some other interests that are special to a certain 
city (Manda, 1999, p. 40). In order to put together these categories of interest, the 
state has created legal regulations or special institutions, each of them providing a 
solution more or less appropriate to actual situations. 
The working hypothesis taken into account in this analysis is that in Romania, 
the formulation and/or distortion of the public interest represents the cumulative 
effect of the activity of local decision-makers, of the scarce, often oscillating and 
contradictory intervention of the citizens and of the interest groups.
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2. Methodology
The definition taken into account for the local public interest is ‘the amount of 
decisions that can serve the interests of the community members’. Because defin-
ing the public interest is not only a deliberative process but also a negotiating pro-
cess, we will analyze the way the public interest is ‘calculated’ and ‘approximated’. 
The documented aspects in terms of sources of formation or/and distortion of the 
public interest are the analysis of the level of representation of the local public 
interest, the limitations of representation and of main forms of participation that 
allow deliberation/negotiation of the local public interest.
3. Theoretical considerations regarding the public interest: 
formulation and representation
The concept of the public interest arises from two major lines of liberal phil-
osophical and historical thought, utilitarianism and contractarianism (Córdoba, 
2010, p. 382). Subsequently, other theories assume new dimensions. Habemas in-
troduces the theory of communicative action. As a matter of fact, it is built either 
by examining the results (consensualism), as in the case of utilitarianism and con-
tractarianism, either by examining the procedure, as in the theory of communica-
tive action. The theories have in common the fact that they consider the public 
interest as a means of creating a fairer society and legitimize the political and ad-
ministrative decision. The utilitarianism proposes that the public interest should 
be the increase of social welfare. However, the utilitarian approach does not refer 
to the way the increased social welfare is shared between individuals and social 
groups. The utilitarianism uses an unifying principle and the issue of fairness is 
seen only as a matter of maximizing the collective utility. Such an aggregation can 
still hide the high and unacceptable inequalities that, ethically, should be banned. 
The communicative action replaces the instrumental reason with communicative 
reason. Through rational communication it is possible to reach understanding and 
agreement. The public interest emerges from the best argumentation, accepted by 
everyone. These theoretical concepts lead to the idea that public interest is an ethi-
cal, non-subjective concept that serves the entire community. This involves the fact 
that it contains regulatory elements that determine the social conditions that allow 
people to develop their own life projects (Córdoba, 2010, p. 382). 
The right of representation of the public interest belongs to the democratic in-
stitutions. Although the representation is suspected of introducing a systematic 
distortion between the expectations of some people and the decisions of others and 
is closer to a political bargain than to an ideal of rational legitimation (Dicționar, 
2002, p. 204), it has deep sociological meanings that justify its necessity. The action 
for a common purpose, for the local decisions and for administrative measures 
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requires the invitation of the members of the local territorial community. Actually, 
this is impossible, for at least two points of view: physically and as an union in 
minds and in feeling. It is difficult to summon all citizens from the first to the last 
member. Moreover, there are problems ‘that would be too difficult to solve for an 
entire community’ (Simmel, 2000, p. 404). Individually, the citizens are often not 
able to collect, process and articulate information about the public interests. They 
often don’t have the necessary resources, the expertise and the political networks 
and therefore, they rely on the intermediary actors for this (De Bruycker, 2016, 
p. 7). In this case, the choice of the most capable persons in the community, that 
promise to accomplish what the entire community has to do, has the advantage of 
a wider mobility, of the possibility to gather faster, to take more precise decisions. 
The qualitative advantage, meaning the performance of the representatives that 
overruns the direct action of the community, is exclusively based on the quanti-
tative minus of the representatives. Then, in a large group, the counter-trends are 
inevitable. Each of them has, a priori, the same importance and lack the decision 
power. The suitable expression of this situation is created when even the majority 
does not decide, when any decision-maker obstructs the decision or at least is not 
personally bound to it. The formation of social bodies opposes to this danger. A 
commission, a, a delegation, etc. will have greater competence than all the others; 
therefore, those divergences and oppositions that arise from the simple incompe-
tence will be reduced from the beginning. And, finally, the general action of the 
total group will always be intellectually at a relatively low level, which is why the 
representation of a common interest is delegated to the most proficient and worthy 
people in the group (Simmel, 2000, p. 400).
The quality of the representation of the public interest can be analyzed on the 
basis of the concept of demographic representativity and the concept of politic rep-
resentativity. The concept of demographic representativity assumes that the abil-
ity of an observer to actively represent the interests of some other person is even 
greater as the observer is more similar to him in terms of social position. According 
to this principle, it is essential that the different social categories be represented 
by their members in the decision-maker bodies and not by persons outside them. 
Thus, this theory implies that the interests of women will generally be better rep-
resented by women than by men, the interests of ethnic minorities by the members 
of those minorities, etc.
The concept of politic representativity stresses not the similarity of social char-
acteristics, but the sharing of common beliefs about the world and the communica-
tion and mutual knowledge. Thus, the key for efficient representation of interests 
is to identify some persons with similar values (who may or may not be members 
of the same social and demographic categories) and who have the competence al-
lowing them to know and convey the life situation of those they represent as well 
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as the political skill necessary to negotiate their interests in the political environ-
ment (Zamfir, Stănescu, 2003, p. 346). 
The conditions for the appropriate representation of interests have been ana-
lyzed by theories such as ‘The iron law of oligarchy’, developed by Michels, that 
states that any leader tends to depart from the concerns and interests of those he 
represents due to his functional specialization as a political man (Vlăsceanu, 1993, 
p. 124). His competence makes him indispensable for the effective organization of 
collectivity, but at the same time it changes his way of thinking so that he becomes 
increasingly different from those who have chosen him. 
4. The inconsistency of deliberation and of negotiation of the public interest
The local public interest is defined and/or established through deliberation and 
negotiation processes, in which the more powerful social actors contribute more to 
defining the directions of action. The consistency of deliberation and of negotiation 
of the public interest is determined by two factors: the participation of the public 
and the decision-makers’ degree of expertise and values.
A broad concept, identified in the theory of collective action and of share cap-
ital, the participation has an important role in the production of public or collec-
tive goods, whether they are defined in terms of democracy or of welfare increase 
(Săveanu, 2014, p. 11). Most studies start from the premise that the participation 
is a good thing and go directly the explanation of the factors that determine dif-
ferent forms through which citizens get involved in the life of their community. 
Contextuality is the preferred theory to account for the effects of participation. 
Under favorable conditions, the effects of the participation are primarily related to 
social inclusion, development, efficient government, solving collective dilemmas, 
producing collective goods (Săveanu, 2014, p. 8). Therefore, a favorable context 
for participation will lead to the desired effects, and the multiplication of the same 
participation mechanism may not come to the same result in another context. From 
another perspective, it is denied the idea that a political process can effectively 
express the popular will and the decision-makers look for their own ways to deter-
mine the public interest. The public servants and the local officials have their own 
representation of what is the people’s interest and put this variable in a formula 
that negotiate a ‘public interest’ in relation with some other individual interests. 
In other words, even if they accept that the popular will has to lead to the admin-
istrative action, the decision-makers trust none but their introspection as a means 
to identify the desire of the public. A public librarian who decides which books 
will be purchased for the library collection, a social worker who recommends a 
home for children, a rental manager who decides to suspend the rent – all of them 
pass a judgement within the limits of administrative and legal regulations which 
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are often vague and have a general character. As far as these people identify with 
certain social values, they will extract from these values a concept concerning the 
public interest that they will be able to apply when taking their decisions (Simon, 
2003, p. 706). The receptivity to the public interest means receptivity to its own 
values and attitude to social issues. On the other hand, this receptivity provides 
an important channel through which general values adopted in society (or those 
sections from where the administrators come from) are introduced in the admin-
istrative decision (Simon, 2003, p. 707). In Romania, there are enough mechanisms 
that allow the citizens’ participation to the local public life. Suffice it to recall Law 
no. 3/2000 on the organization and conduct of the referendum, the Law no. 52/2003 
regarding the decisional transparency in the public administration, the Law on 
Local Government, no. 215/2001 republished and the applicable laws – in the field 
of environment, urban planning, etc. In the name of these laws, the local public 
authorities have the obligation to organize the access of the citizens interested in 
the decision-making processes, in order to increase coherence of the administrative 
action. Thus, by participating in the meeting of the deliberative bodies of the local 
collectivities, through local popular initiative or referendum, the citizens are “ne-
gotiators” of the local interest.
Despite the existence of a legal framework that regulates the participation, the 
Reports of the European Commission indicate a poor capacity to develop bot-
tom-up policies and the lack of an active civil society at the regional level (Stănes-
cu, 2015, p. 249). The way in which the Romanian public institutions manage the 
public involvement in the decision-making process is considered at least faulty. 
The administration is open, at least at the declarative level, but does not have 
enough resources and cannot organize the process. It does not know who to call 
for negotiations and what to do with the input (CeRe, 2007, p. 28).
This happens when there are guidelines regarding the organization of public 
debates. They explicitly require to the public servants to record, to publish and 
to archive the following information on the site of the institution: records of pub-
lic debate, the received written recommendations, improved versions of the draft 
legislative act at various stages of elaboration, endorsement reports and the final 
version of the legislative act.
The consultations organized by the public authorities do not seem to be out-
come-oriented, but rather to apply the procedures, to comply with some European 
models, or for fears of protest from non-governmental organizations – these are 
motivations not accompanied by a real interest in consulting the public in deci-
sion-making processes. Besides the difference in language, there is also a differ-
ence of expectations as both actors expect the ‘other’ to be more interested and 
more proactive and to put more resources into the process. The examples of public 
consultation in Romania are more often focused on an alternative or on a public 
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policy solution – the one proposed by the administration. This is also one of the 
reasons for divergence between the dialogue partners and for the difficulty of the 
consultative process – because the stakeholders often tend to look beyond the al-
ternative proposed by the administration, insisting on the issue underlying the 
decision, or on various other solutions. With few exceptions, the data on public 
debates are limited to absolutely formal statistics – such as ‘X representatives were 
present’. Who has participated, the content of the debates, the eventual changes in 
the projects under discussion are not known (CeRe, 2007, pp. 28-29).
The referendum is a democratic instrument used when the deliberation of the 
local public interest becomes necessary. The law imposes several conditions for 
the organization of the referendum: the obligation to have a referendum in certain 
situations (modification of the limits of the territorial and administrative divisions, 
dismissal of the mayor, dissolution of the deliberative authority) or if there is a 
problem of particular interest. Neither the law of the referendum nor the Law of 
the local government enumerate in their contents what issues might be considered 
of special interest. The domain of these issues is quite extended, and their descrip-
tion as a matter of particular interest is subject to debate. It is only very clear that 
the issues of particular interest may be of an administrative nature, never of a po-
litical nature (Gîrleşteanu, 2009, p. 57).
The major difficulty in formulating an issue of particular interest is the aggre-
gation of preferences. In classical political theories, ‘the public interest’ seems to be 
something that can activate all types of voters, but it is actually ignored that ‘the 
public interest’ is different for different individuals. The problems are real and the 
ideals are unstable (Bozeman, 2007, pp. 88-89). May’s theorem, which states that 
the simple majority is only rule that is minimally effective and has the property of 
formal political equality, does not help us to overcome this difficulty. For the social 
processes, the representation of the collective action through the contribution of 
some representatives has a high purpose. If a real majority will act together, then 
this will only happen in those directions that make it possible for a highly-placed 
person to descend to the level of a person placed below. The experience proves that 
the popular meetings often take the most foolish and most damaging decisions. 
This is not only the result of that fatal downward alignment, which condition the 
co-operation of a mass, but it is also important the aspect that in a crowd gathered 
together the leadership will take by the most temperamental, radical, loudest ele-
ments, not by the most representative one from an intellectual point of view, who 
often lack the passionate subjectivity, the suggestion of conquest (Simmel, 2000, p. 
404). Marshall uses the example that freedom of expression has no value if, by lack 
of education, someone has little to say (Lister, 2007, p. 23). 
Coming back to the realities in Romania, we find that at local level, the main 
actors involved in the deliberation of the local interest are the local government 
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authorities. The issue of special interest is decided in two successive and com-
pulsory stages: the first stage involves proposing a problem as being of public 
interest; in the second stage it is decided whether this problem is of local public 
interest. The proposals may come from the executive authorities or from a third of 
the number of representatives of the deliberative authorities. In these two stages, 
the citizens are indirectly involved, only to the extent that third of counsellors 
or the executive authority has received their initiative and represent it. The local 
counsellors’ vote decides whether the issue is of particular interest and will be 
subject to consultation by referendum. The existent data suggest that in Romania, 
the use of the referendum as an instrument for negotiation and deliberation of the 
public interest is still poor (Marinescu, 2016, p. 74). From the 26 local and county 
referenda held between January 2009 and May 2011, only 11 were validated. 9 
of them were organized for the modification of the limits of the territorial and 
administrative divisions of some communes or towns, 3 of them for dissolution 
of the Local Council. The remaining 14 referendums had the aim to change the 
name of some towns or the passing of some localities from the commune rank 
to the town rank or vice versa. From the three referendums for the dissolution of 
the Local Council, although all answers were favorable to the dissolution, only 
one was materialized and led to the dissolution of the Council. It is the case of 
the referendum from Cornățelu commune (Dâmbovița county), from October, the 
11th 2009. The voter turnout was 60%, with 666 ‘YES’ votes and 40 ‘NO’ votes. 
Nine of the referendums from that time took place in cities. Among them, only 
three were validated, because the low turnout. Four out of the nine referendums 
held in the cities during this period focused on the consultation regarding issues 
of special local interest for the purpose of the Referendum Law no. 5/2000. These 
four referendums had a consultative character. Five out of the nine local referen-
dums were compulsory and focused on the modification of the limits of the ter-
ritorial and administrative divisions. The higher voter turnout was registered at 
the consultative referendum in Năvodari (Constanța county) city held on the 23th 
of May 2010. The citizens have been called to express their opinion about the 
‘creation of a Center for Industrial and General Waste Management in the city of 
Năvodari’. The referendum was validated (with a 72% voter turnout), with 23,431 
votes against and only 131 votes for. The other two referendums, that have been 
organized in towns and municipalities and have been validated, were mandato-
ry and aimed at changing the territorial boundaries: Voluntari (Ilfov) and Ovid-
iu (Constanta). As for the referendum in the town of Voluntari, it took place on 
22th of November 2009 and aimed at modifying the territorial delimitation of the 
city, while preserving the autonomy of the territorial and administrative division. 
With a voter turnout of 55%, the local citizens voted mostly ‘YES’: 12,034 ‘YES’ 
votes and 3,480 ‘NO’ votes.
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The invalidated referendums have been organized in the following towns: 
Avrig (Sibiu county – 18% voter turnout), Buftea (Ilfov county —40% voter turn-
out), Căzănești (Ialomița county— 28,56% voter turnout), Baia-Mare (Maramureș 
county – 12,67% voter turnout), Cajvana (Suceava county —36,69% voter turnout), 
Milășăuți (Suceava county —34,20% voter turnout). (Gavril, 2011). 
The state change and the modification of the limits of the territorial and admin-
istrative divisions through mandatory referendum and consultative referendums 
concerning the use of natural resources are eloquent examples for the study of the 
public interest. As one of the conditions for joining the European Union was a cer-
tain level of urbanization, more communes were turned to this rank. 50 communes 
have been transformed into cities so that Romania is able to join the European 
Union (Florea, 2016). Over time, in some cases, it turned out that this change has 
brought people only higher taxes. The European funds on which the city-ranked 
localities relied were soon unavailable, because the status of a city didn’t allow 
the access to funds for sewerage, potable water supply and road asphalting, since 
all of these were sine qua non conditions for the status of a city. Therefore, many 
localities in Romania have become urban places only on paper, as they didn’t have 
sewerage, potable water and asphalted roads. While in 2004 the local elections 
were won with the slogan ‘We want a city, not a commune!’, in 2016 the election 
campaign is totally different, this year witnessing the most initiatives to return to 
the original status. Legally, all localities that have got the status of a city can return, 
by referendum, to the original status. Only one locality that became a town after 
2004 was demoted (Dragomireşti, Maramureş).
According to data of the National Statistics Institute (INS), during the last 25 
years, 131 villages have been erased from the territorial structure of the country. 
From the 13.088 existent villages existing in 1990, only 12.957 were left at the end 
of 2014. However, the process of creation of towns and city municipalities after the 
year 1989 – with a peak in 2004 – doesn’t seem to be a result of an objective neces-
sity to create urban territorial and administrative divisions (either for the develop-
ment of a certain territory, or as a result of a finding of a actual situation. The same 
remark can be made in the case of newly founded communes (by the division of 
larger sized communes), a rather active process until 2007. The increasing number 
of urban localities by declaring new cities and municipalities was not an effective 
solution to solve the problems of isolated areas and to create urban units with the 
status of development pole at the local level (Strategia de Dezvoltare teritorială, 
2014, p. 23). ‘Although there are some criteria regarding the minimum population, 
the decision to turn a commune into a city, or to turn a city into a municipality, 
usually has a political nuance’ (Raport Banca Mondială, 2013, p. 66). Roșia Mon-
tană is a special case. The locals from 35 towns in Alba County are called to a con-
sultative referendum to rule on the re-launch of mining in the Apuseni Mountains. 
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The local authorities representing the citizens of the towns ratify the organization 
of the referendum, the Romanian Academy is against the restarting of mining, ar-
guing that the exploitation designed for a period of 17-20 years is not a solution for 
sustainable development and does not solve the social and economic problems of 
the area, which will worsen after the completion of the works (Declarația Acade-
miei Române, 2007), and the representatives of the civil society strongly oppose the 
project. The referendum was invalidated for lack of quorum.
At least in this case, the ‘organizational hypocrisy’ of the public authorities is 
evident. Nils Brunsson noticed that the organizations that have the intention to 
reflect and represent the social environment – such as political parties, public ad-
ministration, or the organizations with an assumed mission to pursue the public 
interest – inevitably suffer from ‘organizational hypocrisy.’ In order to cope with 
the contradictory demands of different interest groups, the organization separates 
its discourse from its decisions and actions. Thus, the discourse can be oriented 
towards a social group, the decisions can satisfy another social group, and the ac-
tions will favor some other categories. The employees of such organizations are al-
ways caught up in solving insoluble problems, torn between the incompatible de-
mands of different aspects of the problem (Iorga, 2006, p. 75). Moreover, the local 
authorities involved in the deliberation process had a superior position towards 
the citizens in terms of the amount of information, in terms of the legal relevance of 
the referendum, as well as of what mean the restarting of the mining project. Even 
if the referendum had been validated and the citizens had voted in favor, some 
other procedures, including the environmental permit, would have been required 
for the effective implementation of the project.
5. Conclusions
The appeal to the public interest generally implies persuasion and justification 
and this justification influences the public’s level of trust. Most times, the public 
does not trust the authorities. Based on the analysis, the data lead to the idea that 
the local public interest does not exist, or if it exists and where it exists, its forma-
tion and distortion depend on the same type of sources. In the deliberation and the 
negotiation prior to the deliberation of interest, citizens and local public authori-
ties are involved. In most cases, the local authorities have resources and a greater 
power of persuasion in taking the final decision.
All forms of public consultation are organized on the initiative of the adminis-
tration, some are purely formal, others have a planned outcome, and the decision 
to consider an issue of public interest belongs exclusively to the local public ad-
ministration. While for the case of Roșia Montană the local councils approved the 
referendum regarding the mining, the local council from Craiova rejected the ref-
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erendum against the projects from Kozlodui, in ordinary session, despite the fact 
that it was requested against signatures of over 15,000 citizens of the municipality. 
Moreover, in this case 15 counsellors out of 27 (25 attended the meeting) abstained 
from voting (Grosereanu, 2015).
The acceptance of the public interest as a guiding rule in the organization of 
the activities for the benefit of the community involves adjusting the ambitions of 
politicians as well as the social and economic pressures. The representation of the 
public interest requires temporary compromises, transparent decisions, based on 
evidence, innovation and creativity.
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